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Abstract 
Although the importance of technological change for increasing prosperity is undisputed and economists 
typically deem it unlikely that labor-saving technology causes long-term employment losses, people’s 
anxiety about automation and its distributive consequences can be an important shaper of economic and 
social policies. This paper considers the political economy of automation, proposing that individuals in 
occupations that are more at risk of losing their job to automation have stronger preferences for 
government redistribution. Analysis of cross-national individual-level survey data from three different 
sources confirms the effect of occupational automation risk on redistribution preferences. The same effect 
is found when considering indirect exposure to automation risk through the occupation of one’s spouse or 
partner and using the automatability of individuals’ own occupation as a generic control variable. In 
addition, the effect is not limited to the preference for redistribution in general but extends to a preference 
for a specific policy with redistributive consequences, namely the preference for government support of 
declining industries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whereas few people deny the power of technological change to radically transform economies, 
economists typically emphasize the long-run benefits of creative destruction and technological change for 
increasing prosperity (Autor 2015; Mokyr et al. 2015). Advances in robotics, task automation, machine 
learning and artificial intelligence algorithms, however, have been fueling widespread concerns about the 
possibility of long-lasting technological unemployment and the disruptive effect of labor-saving 
technology on society (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Etzioni 2017; Ford 2015; Krugman 2012; Sachs 
and Kotlikoff 2012; Srnicek and Williams 2015; Summers 2013). The core of such automation anxiety is 
that technological change has distributional effects between groups in society, meaning that the benefits 
of technological change are not spread evenly.1 Recent debate and anxiety thereby highlight a specific 
automation concern, which is that some workers or occupations end up losing from labor-saving 
technology not just compared to other groups but also in absolute terms. If large groups in society are 
indeed in danger of long-run losses from automation this would be a powerful shaper of economic and 
social policies. Jobs that are more automatable come with higher unemployment risk and economic 
uncertainty, stoking up demand for government action that mitigates or insures against income losses. 
Different estimates of the labor market effects of automation exist. Frey and Osborne (2017), for example, 
find that approximately 47% of the U.S. labor force is at risk of displacement by machines. A report by 
McKinsey (2017) similarly finds that roughly six out of ten occupations in the U.S. involves tasks that 
can be automated for at least 30%. Finally, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) consider the effect of 
robotization on the U.S. labor market, estimating that one additional robot per 1,000 workers reduces the 
                                                          
1 Concern with automation has a long history involving the likes of Keynes (1930) and Marx (1887) 
before him as well as the famous Luddite movement, which protested automation by destroying weaving 
equipment in early 19th century England (Akst 2013; Hobsbawm 1952; Sale 1995). I use the terms 
automation and labor-saving technology interchangeably. Formally, however, the latter includes both 
automation and mechanization. 
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employment ratio by 0.18-0.34 percentage points and wages by 0.25-0.5%. 
This paper considers the political economy of automation, linking the automatability of work, 
specifically individuals’ risk of losing their job to automation, to preferences for redistribution. 
Redistributing material wealth has traditionally been one of the most important roles played by 
governments and individuals’ preferences for redistribution have been widely studied (Ashok et al. 2015; 
Corneo and Grüner 2000; Dahlberg et al. 2012; Fong 2001; Kuziemko et al. 2015; Luttmer 2001; Luttmer 
and Singhal 2011). The workhorse model for understanding differences in preferences for redistribution 
comes from Meltzer and Richards’ (1981) seminal work, which emphasizes the role of individuals’ 
income (relative to the median) (see, also, Romer 1975 and Roberts 1977). However, expectations 
concerning future income or wealth and socioeconomic mobility are also commonly proposed as 
determinants of redistribution preferences (Bénabou and Ok 2001; Piketty 1995) and confirmed by 
empirical evidence. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), for instance, find that negative expectations about 
future welfare increase demand for redistribution (see, also, for example, Corneo and Grüner 2002). My 
hypothesis is that greater occupational automation risk leads to a stronger preference for redistribution. 
The underlying logic is that individuals are aware of the nature of their job tasks and recognize the 
implications of their occupational task content for the automatability of their work and hence for their 
income and wealth prospects and the net pecuniary gains that they can expect from government 
redistribution. 
In order to analyze the effect of exposure to automation risk on preferences for redistribution, this 
paper follows earlier work on occupational task content (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor 2011) and draws on 
individual-level survey data to construct an aggregate indicator of the degree of automatability of 
different occupations. Empirical analysis shows that combining insights on the risk of job loss due to 
automation from employees actually working in a particular type of job renders a valid measure of 
occupational automatability or exposure to automation risk. Individual-level cross-national data on self-
reported preferences for redistribution and various other factors recognized to affect these preferences 
come from the International Social Survey Programme modules on Social Inequality (ISSP-SI), four 
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waves of data in total (ISSP Research Group 2014). The indicator of occupational automatability is 
matched to these data using codes from the 1988 version of the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO). Seven waves of data from the European Social Survey or ESS (European Social 
Survey 2016) provide a means for triangulating results and taking into account an alternative set of 
potential confounders. Similarly, data from the 1996 and 2006 Role of Government module of the ISSP or 
ISSP-ROG (ISSP Research Group 2008) enables extending results from preferences for redistribution, 
which are relatively broad and abstract, to preferences concerning a specific policy issue, namely 
government support of declining industries. 
Key challenge for valid identification of the causal effect of occupational automation risk on 
preferences for distribution is properly controlling for omitted variables. Hence, I consider a large variety 
of control variables, mostly concerning individual-level differences but also concerning differences 
between occupations. Rather uniquely, these controls do not only involve standard variables such as 
education but also, among others, the comprehensive measures of human motivations provided by the 
basic human values framework, the leading framework of personal values in psychology (e.g., Schwartz 
1992; see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). The paper’s main identification strategy, however, is that, instead 
of considering the effect of individuals’ own automation risk, I consider the effect of individuals’ 
exposure to automation risk through the occupation of their spouse or partner, while using the 
automatability of individuals’ own occupation as a generic control variable. 
The key findings of this paper are as follows. First, individuals in occupations that are more at risk of 
job loss due to automation do indeed exhibit stronger preferences for redistribution, indicating an 
important channel through which automation anxiety can end up affecting societies, independent of 
automation’s direct labor market effects. Recent technological change seems to increase economic 
uncertainty for a growing part of the population, prompting citizens to pressure their governments into 
compensatory social and economic policies. Second, occupational task routineness and complexity do not 
affect preferences for redistribution when occupational automatability is taken into account. Finally, the 
effect of occupational automatability on preferences extends to preferences for a concrete economic 
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policy with redistributive consequences in the form of government support of declining industries. 
This paper builds on and contributes to different literatures. The possible economic effects of 
automation have been widely considered, both theoretically and empirically. However, this work focuses 
mostly on direct labor market effects and pays little explicit attention to significant indirect effects 
involving individuals’ attitudes and demand for government policies. Even when the direct labor market 
effects of labor-saving technology and thus the objective threat of future unemployment and income 
losses are limited, automation can still have radical effects on society and its policies. The reason is that 
the subjective perception of automation as an economic threat is already a powerful force influencing 
people. Automation anxiety affects citizens’ political attitudes, changing the political landscape and 
pushing governments into action. This paper, then, provides an important complement to studies of the 
societal implications of key economic trends that focus on direct and objective effects only and pay little 
attention to indirect but more fundamental changes to society brought on by automation, globalization or 
other such developments. 
Measurement of distinct job characteristics and characterizing the task content of employment is an 
important topic in different fields, particularly the labor economics literature on job polarization and the 
new trade literature (Autor and Dorn 2013; Autor et al. 2003; Autor et al. 2015; Blinder and Krueger 
2013; Costinot et al. 2011; Goos et al. 2014). The indicator of occupational automatability constructed for 
the present analysis adds to this literature by providing a valid dimension of occupational task content that 
complements extant indicators of occupational task routineness and complexity. 
This paper resonates most strongly with the literature on preferences for redistribution. The role of net 
pecuniary gains in shaping individuals’ preferences for redistribution has long been recognized (see 
Alesina and Giuliano 2011 for a review). Similarly, much attention has been paid to an individual’s 
income and wealth prospects as determinants of his/her preference for redistribution through their effect 
on expected costs and benefits of government redistribution. Furthermore, there is a growing body of 
research that seeks to flesh out the role of income expectations and mobility perceptions in shaping 
preferences individuals’ expectations about future income or wealth and socioeconomic mobility. 
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Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013), for example, find that individuals that have experienced a recession 
during their formative years end up preferring more government redistribution. Similarly, Alesina et al. 
(2018) find that perceptions of intergenerational mobility shape redistribution preferences, even when 
these perceptions do not accurately match reality. The nature of individuals’ occupation, in contrast, does 
not yet figure prominently in this literature. The evidence presented in this paper, however, suggests that 
job characteristics are an important factor shaping individuals’ expectations about future income and 
socioeconomic mobility.  
 
II. OCCUPATIONAL AUTOMATABILITY 
II.A. Measuring Occupational Automatability 
Measurement of the automatability of occupations in this paper follows the seminal work by Autor et al. 
(2003) and other important studies of the task content of employment that have appeared since (e.g., 
Autor and Dorn 2013; Goos et al. 2014). Two main approaches to assessing the automatability of jobs can 
be discerned. The first approach revolves around well-established job or task characteristics such as 
routineness or complexity (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Following this approach, a job can be seen as 
comprising a set of tasks, each of which can be more or less susceptible to automation, not least because 
each task involves more or less routineness and complexity. The automatability of a given job is therefore 
a function of the automatability of individual job tasks, weighted by the importance of each task as part of 
the overall content of the job. The second approach is to rely on technology experts judging the overall 
automatability of different jobs (cf. Frey and Osborne 2017). 
The approach in this paper is closer to the latter approach, as it involves aggregated knowledge of 
employees actually working in a particular type of occupation. The underlying idea is that this approach 
harnesses the wisdom of crowds and helps overcome biases likely to occur using any of the other two 
approaches. Calculating occupational automatability on the basis of task content is an intricate process 
that requires not only that task attributes such as routineness are measured accurately but also that each 
task is assigned proper weight as part of the overall task content of a given occupation. Expert judgments 
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face other limitations. A particular concern is the possibility that there are blind spots that are shared by 
the group of experts asked for their opinion, which is quite likely when the assessment involves a large 
number of jobs. Two further challenges are lack of cultural diversity among the experts consulted and the 
use of a system of job classification that does not follow international standards. In these cases, the 
concern is that the resulting measure of occupational automatability is not universally applicable or valid, 
likely causing a bias in subsequent empirical analyses.2 
To implement my proposed approach, I rely on data collected by the International Social Survey 
Programme in the 1997 module on Work Orientations or ISSP-WO (ISSP Research Group 1999). This 
module surveyed respondents from a diverse group of 21 country regions about various aspects of their 
jobs.3 One specific item asked respondents about the likely effect of automation on employment: “New 
kinds of technology are being introduced more and more in [country]: computers, robots, and so on. Do 
you think these new technologies will over the next few years...” The Likert type answer scale provided to 
respondents comprised five possible answers: “1, Greatly increase the number of jobs?,” “2, Slightly 
increase the number of jobs?,” “3, Make no difference to the number of jobs?,” “4, Slightly reduce the 
number of jobs?,” or “5, Greatly reduce the number jobs?” For more than 19,000 respondents, the survey 
further recorded their occupation using four-digit codes from the 1988 version of the international 
standard classification of occupations (ISCO). For an additional 5,000 respondents, the 1997 ISSP module 
                                                          
2 As an illustration, in cross-country cross-industry analyses such systematic differences in the accuracy 
of the industry benchmark considered are known to cause an “amplification bias” (see, for example, 
Ciccone and Papaioannou 2016). 
3 There have been three other ISSP Work Orientations modules in 1989, 2005 and 2015. Each of these 
modules, however, has collected slightly different data than the 1997 module. The country regions 
covered by the 1997 module are Germany (East and West separately), Great Britain, U.S., Hungary, 
Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, 
Israel (Jews and Arabs separately), France, Cyprus, Portugal, Denmark and Switzerland., 
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on Work Orientations recorded their occupation using three-digit ISCO88 codes. 
My proposed indicator of occupational automatability involves aggregating individual assessments of 
automation-driven job loss at the level of two-digit ISCO codes, which is the most common level of 
analysis in studies of the economic implications of occupational task content (e.g., Goos et al. 2014). 
Hence, I combine the available three-digit and four-digit occupational data and convert them into two-
digit ISCO codes. To make sure that calculated averages of the individual responses are reliable, the 
empirical analysis limits the sample to consider only two-digit occupations for which the aggregate 
automatability score is based on data from minimum 20 individual respondents. However, as a robustness 
check, I also repeat my baseline analyses using different thresholds for the minimum number of 
underlying individual responses. Similarly, I also estimate models in which occupational automatability is 
measured at the three- or four-digit ISCO level instead of at the two-digit level. Advantage of measuring 
automatability at the three- or four-digit ISCO level is that the resulting indicator is more fine-grained. 
Disadvantage is not only that the two-digit level is the more common level of analysis but also that using 
a three- or four-digit classification leaves fewer individuals per occupational code, on average, resulting 
in an indicator that is more noisy. Table A.1 in Appendix A presents automatability scores for selected 
two-digit occupations. 
 
II.B. Validity of Measured Occupational Automatability 
The indicator of occupational automatability constructed above has much intuitive appeal. Instead of 
imposing a personal view on what makes a job more or less automatable, the approach harnesses the 
wisdom of crowds to create an indicator that is void of individual biases or other such subjectivity. 
Moving beyond intuitive appeal, however, there are also different pieces of evidence testifying to the 
validity of the automatability indicator thus constructed. 
First, gauging Table A.1, measured automatability differences have strong face validity in that 
occupations intuitively expected to have low/high automation risk indeed have low/high automation risk 
(e.g., Legislators and senior officials or Physical, mathematical, engineering science professionals vs. 
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Machine operators and assemblers or Drivers and mobile plant operators). For a formal test of the 
(construct) validity of the occupational automatability indicator, I further consider how this indicator 
correlates with other indicators measuring related constructs, particularly occupational routineness and 
complexity. Though distinct constructs, measured automation risk should correlate reasonably strongly 
both with differences in occupational task routineness and with differences in occupational task 
complexity (cf. Goos et al. 2014). Table I presents the results. 
 
<<Insert Table I about here>> 
 
As expected, automatability correlates strongly positively with job routineness and strongly negatively 
with job complexity. At the same time, correlations found are not so strong to suggest that routineness or 
complexity are essentially the same as automatability. Hence, the automatability indicator appears to add 
to common routineness and complexity indicators, capturing features of occupational task content not 
fully captured by either of these two job characteristics. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
III.A. Empirical Model and Identification Strategy 
The basic empirical model used to assess the effect of automatability of individuals’ jobs on their 
preferences for redistribution reads: 
 
 P୧୭ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵA୭ ൅ βଶ܆୧ ൅ βଷ܈୭ ൅ ε୧୭.      (1) 
 
In this model, Pio is the preference for redistribution of individual i working in occupation o, Ao is the 
automatability of occupation o, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, and Zo is a vector of 
occupational characteristics other than automatability, and εio is a random error term. Per my hypothesis, I 
expect that β1 is statistically significantly positive, as this would indicate that individuals that are more at 
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risk of losing their job to automation have a stronger preference for redistribution. Because the analysis 
involves data that are structured hierarchically with individuals nested in occupations, I use robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the level of occupations. 
As indicated, key challenge for valid identification of the causal effect of occupational automation risk 
on preferences for distribution is properly controlling for omitted variables. Two factors stand out as 
possible sources of an omitted variable bias. The first is a personal trait or generic preference factor that 
might affect both individuals’ preference for redistribution and their preference for jobs with a particular 
task content, which, in turn, might correlate with the degree to which these jobs are automatable. The 
second factor concerns an individual’s skill level, which likely affects both his/her net pecuniary gain 
from redistribution and his/her ability to find employment in jobs with particular task content. Notably, it 
seems likely that individuals with comparatively low skill levels have more difficulty finding employment 
in occupations with low automation risk and vice versa. 
Following these two main sources of potential omitted variable bias, the main analyses include an 
extensive set of control variables, not least of which are various measures of individuals’ preferences. 
Concerning skill level, basic control variables are years of education and educational degree, but also 
measures of individuals’ employment status, which, in turn, is partly a realized outcome of occupational 
automatability. In addition, I check results with key features of individuals’ occupation, specifically 
occupational task routineness and occupational task complexity, controlled for. Details on the specific 
variables and measures used, which vary between data sets, are presented below and in Tables A.2-A.4 in 
Appendix A. 
The paper’s main identification strategy is to consider the effect of an individual’s indirect exposure to 
automation risk through the occupation of his/her spouse or partner, while controlling for the individual’s 
own, direct exposure to automation risk. The underlying logic is as follows. First, spousal automation risk 
is likely to affect an individual’s wealth prospects and hence his/her expected net pecuniary gains from 
government redistribution. Compared to the direct effect of the automatability of one’s own occupation, 
the effect of spousal automation risk is likely much weaker, but the effect may still be significant. Second, 
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the measure of individuals’ own occupational automation risk provides a powerful means of controlling 
for omitted variables, not least any unobserved differences in preferences or skill levels not yet captured 
by the various other control variables. 
 
III.B. Data Sources 
The main data for this paper is individual-level survey data from the ISSP modules on Social Inequality 
or ISSP-SI (ISSP Research Group 2014). The modules have been conducted in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 
2009 and include data on respondents from 28 country regions.4 In addition to data on self-reported 
preferences for redistribution and various other important variables, these modules have recorded 
respondents’ occupation using the 1988 version of the ISCO. The measure of occupational automation 
risk applies the same occupational classification so that the individual-level ISSP-SI data can be matched 
to the automatability indicator constructed and validated in the previous section. The ISSP Social 
Inequality module(s) are commonly used to study preferences for redistribution (Corneo and Grüner 
2000; Eugster et al. 2011; Kerr 2014). Dropping respondents with missing answers leaves about 45,000 
individuals, depending on the model specification used. Table A.2 in Appendix A presents a description 
of the variables in the four ISSP Social Inequality modules used for the empirical analysis and some 
descriptive statistics. 
Whereas the analyses using ISSP-SI data are my main analyses, as part of my robustness checks I also 
consider samples of individuals from two alternative data sources. The first of these alternative sources is 
the European Social Survey or ESS, Waves 1-7 (European Social Survey 2016). These data have been 
collected bi-annually during the period 2002-2014 and cover 32 mostly European and some Eurasian 
                                                          
4 These country regions are Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic (both also as part of former Czechoslovakia), France, (East and West) Germany, Great 
Britain, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and U.S. 
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countries. Chief motivation for using data from the ESS is that the ESS includes interesting individual-
level (control) variables not available in the ISSP Social Inequality modules. In addition, the ESS covers a 
different group of countries than the ISSP-SI does, which increases the international generalizability of 
my results.5 Dropping respondents with missing answers leaves almost 150,000 individuals, depending on 
the model specification used. Table A.3 in Appendix A presents a description of the variables in the ESS 
used for the empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics. The second alternative data source is the 
third and fourth Role of Government module of the ISSP or ISSP-ROG (ISSP Research Group 2008). 
These data have been collected in 1996 and 2006 and cover 20 country regions.6 Main motivation for 
using ISSP-ROG data is that these data provide an alternative dependent variable concerning individuals’ 
preference for government support of declining industries. The advantage is that this preference is more 
specific about the preferred policy action. In addition, considering this particular preference as the 
dependent variable enables including measures of more generic preferences for redistribution as control 
variables, providing powerful means to address potential omitted variable bias. Dropping respondents 
with missing answers leaves about 29,000 individuals, depending on the model specification used. Table 
A.4 in Appendix A presents a description of the variables in the third and fourth ISSP Role of 
Government modules used for the empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics. 
 
                                                          
5 These country regions are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, 
Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
6 Data from the other ISSP Role of Government modules cannot be used because these modules have not 
collected data on occupation. The countries covered by the third and fourth Role of Government module 
are Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and U.S. 
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III.C. Variables and Measures 
III.C.1. Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable in this paper is an individual’s preference for redistribution. The specific 
item from the ISSP-SI that I use to measure this preference asks respondents whether the government 
should reduce income differences. The first part of this item reads: “It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low 
incomes.” Possible answers are given by the following Likert -type scale: “1, Strongly agree,” “2, Agree,” 
“3, Neither agree nor disagree,” “4, Disagree,” or “5, Strongly disagree.” To facilitate interpretation, I 
reverse code scores on this item so that higher scores indicate a stronger preference for redistribution. 
Similarly, the main analyses reported in this paper treat this item as a continuous measure of 
redistribution preferences. However, I obtain similar results when I estimate the empirical models using 
ordered probit or ordered logit techniques (detailed results available on request). As mentioned, the 
measure of preferences for redistribution available from the ISSP-SI data is widely used (e.g., Corneo and 
Grüner 2000). However, to be complete, Table A.5 in Appendix A presents some stylized evidence on the 
validity of this measure. If the ISSP-SI measure of preferences for redistribution is valid, we would, 
expect, for instance, a positive relation between this measure and measures of individuals’ attitudes 
towards basic income and unemployment benefits, which is confirmed by the evidence. 
The ESS item measuring preferences for redistribution is highly similar to the ISSP-SI item. It asks 
respondents about the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement that “the government 
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” The answer scale is again a five-point 
Likert-type scale: “1, Agree strongly,” “2, Agree,” “3, Neither agree nor disagree,” “4, Disagree,” or “5, 
Disagree strongly.” As before, I reverse code scores on this item. 
Finally, as indicated, data available from the ISSP-ROG offers the opportunity to assess the effect of 
occupational automatability on a concrete economic policy with redistributive consequences in the form 
of government support of declining industries. The relevant item starts with a generic text asking about 
economic policies: “Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which 
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actions you are in favor of and which you are against.” The specific policy is thereby described as 
“support for declining industries to protect jobs” and answers are recorded on a five-point Likert-type 
scale that is reverse coded for the empirical analysis: “1, Strongly in favor of,” “2, In favor of,” “3, 
Neither in favor of nor against,” “4, Against,” or “5, Strongly against.” 
 
III.C.2. Independent Variables 
For most of the empirical analyses in this paper, the key independent variable is the indicator of 
occupational automatability constructed in the previous section. As indicated, I match this indicator to the 
individual-level ISSP-SI and ISSP-ROG data using two-digit codes from the 1988 version of the ISCO. I 
apply the same matching procedure for the analyses involving individual-level data from the ESS. 
However, Waves 6 and 7 of the ESS (2012 and 2014) have not recorded occupation using ISCO88 codes 
but using ISCO08 codes. Hence, for these two waves I first convert ISCO08 codes into ISCO88 codes 
using the crosswalk provided by Ganzeboom and Treiman (2015). All the analyses include year/wave 
fixed effects that capture measurement error that is specific to particular waves. 
As discussed, as part of my identification strategy instead of considering the effect of individuals’ own 
automation risk, I consider the effect of individuals’ exposure to automation risk through the occupation 
of their spouse or partner. All three data sources—ISSP-SI, ESS and ISSP-ROG—have collected data on 
the occupation of individuals’ spouses using ISCO codes. Although considering spousal occupation risk 
has the advantage that the automatability of individuals’ own occupation can be used as a generic control 
variable, the disadvantage is that the sample is reduced to individuals with a partner only. As before, 
matching of the occupational automatability indicator is done on the basis of two-digit codes from the 
1988 version of the ISCO. Similarly, spousal occupation data from Waves 6 and 7 of the ESS are again 
converted from ISCO08 codes into ISCO88 codes before matching. 
 
III.C.3. Basic Control Variables 
The main empirical models that I estimate include various control variables. Some basic control variables 
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that I consider are sex (1=male), age and age squared. Because my data are cross-national and collected at 
different points in time, the basic set of controls not only includes year (or wave) dummies but also 
country dummies. Preferences for redistribution and occupational automatability likely correlate with 
education. Hence, I also control for measures of educational differences. To be exhaustive, I thereby use 
two different measures, one concerning years of education and one concerning level of education (e.g., no 
formal qualification, lowest formal qualification, et cetera). Similarly, although employment status is 
partly a realized outcome of occupational automation risk, all models include controls for employment 
status as a proxy for individual skill differences. Because prior studies find a role for religion in shaping 
preferences for redistribution (e.g., Basten and Betz 2013), I further include sets of dummies both for 
individuals’ religious denomination and for their attendance of religious services. Tables A.2-A.4 in 
Appendix A provide details on the measures used. 
As much as possible, the control variables that I include to address potential omitted variable bias are 
measured at the individual level. The skill intensity of one’s occupation may, for instance, affect 
preferences for redistribution but this effect is controlled for by including measures of individuals’ years 
of education and education level. Notwithstanding, to make sure that any found effect of occupational 
automatability on preferences for redistribution is genuinely due to automatability I also consider two 
other features of individuals’ occupation, namely its routineness and its complexity. The specific 
measures that I use are the same measures of job routineness and job complexity considered earlier (see 
Table I for details). An important downside of including these two control variables is that they are 
available for fewer occupations than the measure of occupational automatability is. Hence, the models 
that control for occupational task routineness and complexity are not my preferred models. 
 
III.B.4. Sample-Specific Control Variables 
Whereas the basic control variables are independent from the sample considered, ISSP-SI, ESS or ISSP-
ROG, further control variables that I use are typically only available for a specific sample. 
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ISSP-SI Control Variables 
Relevant control variables that are specific to the ISSP-SI sample concern individuals’ economic and 
social status and their experience of socioeconomic mobility. Both these factors are partly a realized 
outcome of occupational automation risk but also important determinants of preferences of redistribution 
(see, for example, Alesina et al. 2018 or Corneo and Grüner 2002). I measure economic status using an 
item asking respondents about their social class (e.g., working class or middle class) and social status 
using an item asking respondents to rank their social position in society, whether they tend towards the 
top or towards the bottom. Concerning socioeconomic mobility, I consider individuals’ actual experience 
of mobility, which is measured by a set of dummies that measures how the prestige of an individual’s job 
compares to the prestige of the job of his/her father. In addition, I consider a measure of individuals’ self-
reported beliefs about what it is needed for getting ahead in society, specifically the importance of family 
income. Table A.2 provides details on these items and the measures used in the analyses of the ISSP-SI 
sample. 
 
ESS Control Variables 
Relevant control variables that are specific to the ESS sample again concern economic status and 
experienced socioeconomic mobility but also two other measures that speak to the net pecuniary gains 
that an individual can expect from redistribution and his/her skill level. In addition, the analyses of the 
ESS sample consider some unique measures of individuals’ preferences and motivations. To proxy 
economic status I use the ESS item asking respondents about their income (measured on a 10- or 12-point 
scale) to create an indicator of rank income, meaning the percentile score of an individual’s income 
relative to other individuals in the same country. Similarly, I consider experienced socioeconomic 
mobility by including two sets of dummies capturing features of the socioeconomic status of individuals’ 
parents. The first set concerns the level of education of an individual’s father and mother respectively, 
while the second set concerns the employment status of the individual’s father and his/her mother when 
the individual was 14 years old. A further ESS-specific control variable that I consider because it likely 
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affect individuals’ expected benefits from government redistribution is their health status where 
individuals with poorer health are expected to benefit more from redistribution and therefore to have 
stronger preferences for redistribution. Similarly, I consider an individual’s prior unemployment 
experience (1=yes; 0=no), as this variable speaks to the individual’s skill level but also to the likelihood 
of future unemployment and hence his/her income and wealth prospects. 
Concerning individuals’ preferences I include a variety of measures. The first measure is the classic 
left-right political self-placement scale in which respondents identify their political preferences on a 
spectrum that ranges from left to right (e.g., Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). Left-right political 
orientation has been identified as part of a cluster of preferences involving the role of government in the 
economy, including preferences for redistribution (Jæger 2008; Knutsen 1995; Scheepers and Te 
Grotenhuis 2005). Hence, including this measure provides powerful means to rule out that there is a 
generic preference factor that causes individuals with a strong preference for redistribution to self-select 
into occupations that are highly automatable and vice versa.  
The second measure is a composite index of individuals’ trust in politics, specifically trust in their 
country’s parliament and trust in politicians. The idea is that occupational automation risk affects 
individuals’ political attitudes, which then may go on to affect their preferences for redistribution. By 
controlling for trust in politics, however, the analysis can focus on the direct effect of automation risk on 
preferences for redistribution. Table A.3 provides details on the construction of the trust in politics index 
and the various other items and measures used in the analyses of the ESS sample. 
Finally, I include a set of indicators measuring individuals’ basic values, as identified by Schwartz’s 
framework of universal human values, the leading framework of personal values in psychology (e.g., 
Schwartz 1992). The 10 basic values in this framework are universal in that they are recognized in all 
cultures and distinct in that they refer to different motivations. The values further form a circumplex that 
reflects the compatibility of each motivation with the other motivations. Specifically, values that are close 
in the circumplex have compatible motivations, referring to goals that can be achieved simultaneously 
without one necessarily coming at the expense of the other (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). Values that 
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are opposite each other in the circumplex, in contrast, are not compatible and cannot be achieved 
simultaneously. Finally, the framework conceptualizes values as having a relative priority only and not an 
absolute priority. Hence, it is not possible for individuals to attach great value to everything. A short 
description of the 10 basic values is as follows (Schwartz et al. 2001, p. 270): Power refers to a desire for 
social status and prestige and for control or dominance over people and resources; Achievement refers to a 
desire for personal success; Hedonism refers to a desire for pleasure and enjoying life; Stimulation refers 
to a desire for novelty and an exciting and challenging life; Self-direction refers to a desire for being 
creative and independent and having freedom; Universalism refers to a desire for understanding, 
appreciating and tolerating others, and protection of the welfare of all people and nature; Benevolence 
refers to a desire for preserving and enhancing the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact; Tradition refers to a desire for respect for, commitment to, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide individuals; Conformity refers to a desire to 
restrain oneself to avoid actions likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms; 
finally, Security refers to a desire for safety, harmony, and social order. Appendix B provides detailed 
information on the empirical operationalization of the framework of universal human values using 
questionnaire items included in the ESS. 
 
ISSP-ROG Control Variables 
Relevant control variables that are specific to the ISSP-ROG sample again concern different measures of 
individuals’ preferences. The Role of Government modules of the ISSP contain data on individuals’ 
preferences towards a variety of social and economic policies. Taking individuals’ preference for 
government support of declining industries as the dependent variable thus creates the opportunity to use 
measures of other policy preferences as control variables. I consider four such preferences. First and 
foremost, when analyzing individuals’ preference for government support of declining industries, I 
control for individuals’ generic preference for redistribution. The second policy preference concerns 
individuals’ preference for government financing of projects for new jobs. The third policy preference 
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concerns individuals’ preference for government spending on unemployment benefits. Finally, the 
analysis of the ISSP-ROG sample considers the preference for government responsibility in providing a 
decent living standard for the unemployed. Together, these four measures likely capture important 
individual differences concerning both preferences and skills that could otherwise bias the analyses using 
individuals’ preference for government support of declining industries as the dependent variable. Table 
A.4 present details on the various ISSP-ROG measures used. Meanwhile, due to missing data, analyses of 
the ISSP-ROG sample are unable to control for some of the factors considered in the analyses of the 
ISSP-SI and ESS samples, for instance socioeconomic mobility. 
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
IV.A. Evidence from the ISSP-SI Sample 
Table II presents the baseline results. Consistent with my hypothesis, results indicate a strong positive 
relationship between the strength of individuals’ preferences for redistribution and their occupational 
automatability or automation risk (Model 1). This relationship becomes only slightly less strong when 
controlling for measures concerning socioeconomic mobility (Model 2) where socioeconomic mobility 
has the expected effect on preferences for redistribution. For example, compared to individuals with a job 
that has much more prestige than their father’s job, the preference for redistribution of individuals with a 
job that has much less prestige than their father’s job is about 0.08 standard deviations higher. Adding 
variables concerning economic and social status does lower the estimated coefficient for occupational 
automatability. However, the relationship remains highly statistically significant (Models 3 and 4). 
Results are also largely the same when considering job routineness and job complexity as additional 
control variables (Model 5). In fact, the estimated coefficient for automation risk increases somewhat in 
Model 5 compared to Model 4. Possible explanation for this finding involves the criterion requiring at 
least 20 individual observations per occupation when constructing occupational routineness and 
complexity indicators, which filters out occupations that are relatively rare (see Section II). Hence, 
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compared to Model 4, Model 5 includes fewer occupations that are relatively rare and for which 
occupational automatability is measured with more measurement error. This reduction in measurement 
error, in turn, could shift the size of the estimated coefficient for occupational automation risk upwards. In 
general, the model with occupational controls is not my preferred model, however, given that this model 
concerns fewer observations, particularly 27 instead of 33 occupations. 
 
<<Insert Table II about here>> 
 
Comparing effect sizes, say, social class seems more important for understanding differences in 
preferences for redistribution than occupational automation risk, as evidenced by the size of the 
standardized coefficient (-0.097 vs. 0.054; Model 3). However, part of the effect of occupational 
automation risk on preferences for redistribution involves occupational automatability negatively 
impacting individuals’ socioeconomic status. Moreover, automatability is measured at the occupation 
level and not at the individual level where there is more variation. 
Finally, results are robust to the use of indicators of occupational automatability constructed using 
fewer or more than 20 underlying individual observations (see Section II) or considering automatability 
measured at the three- or four-digit ISCO level instead of at the two-digit level (Table A.6 in Appendix 
A). The most noticeable difference is that in the models with occupational automatability measured at the 
three- or four-digit level (Models A3 and A4), the estimated coefficient for automation risk is lower than 
before. As before, possible explanation for this finding is that a more fine-grained occupational 
classification implies that the automatability indicator is calculated using fewer underlying individual 
observations per occupation on average, likely resulting in more measurement error and a corresponding 
downward shift in the estimated coefficient. 
 
<<Insert Table III about here>> 
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Digging deeper, results indicate that the apparent effect of exposure to automation risk also occurs 
when considering the occupational automation risk of individuals’ spouses instead of—or, more correctly, 
in addition to—individuals’ own occupational automation risk (Table III). Controlling for employment 
status, social class or job routineness, among others, as in Table II goes a long way in ruling out that the 
relationship between occupational automatability and preferences for redistribution is spurious, driven by, 
say, unobserved differences in individuals’ skills. However, given that the relationship between exposure 
to automation risk and preferences for redistribution also exists in case of indirect exposure, it seems even 
more implausible that some unobserved differences between individuals are driving this apparent 
relationship. Overall, the evidence thus strongly supports a significant effect of occupational automation 
risk on individuals’ preferences for redistribution. 
 
IV.B. Evidence from Other Samples and Further Robustness Checks 
To extend the main analyses involving the ISSP-SI sample and provide further evidence of the robustness 
of the effect of occupational automatability on preferences for redistribution, Tables A.7-A.8 in Appendix 
A present results for analyses using the ESS sample. In all cases, results confirm the conclusion that 
(direct or indirect) exposure to automation risk significantly strengthens individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution. In addition, control variables that are unique to this sample, for example political left-right 
self-placement or health status, have the expected relationship with individuals’ preference for 
redistribution. 
Turning to the ISSP-ROG sample and using a dependent variable that concerns a concrete policy 
action with redistributive consequences, results again support the earlier conclusion that occupational 
automation risk affects individuals’ preferences for redistributive government policy (Table A.9 in 
Appendix A). Also with, among others, individual differences in the generic preference for redistribution 
and for government financing of projects for new jobs controlled for, there is a significant relationship 
between (direct or indirect) exposure to automation risk and the strength of individuals’ preference for 
government support of declining industries. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This paper shows that individuals in occupations that are more at risk of losing their job to automation 
have stronger preferences for redistribution. This result is supported by evidence from three different 
large-scale cross-country survey data sets and extends to preferences for a concrete policy action with 
redistributive consequences in the form of government support for declining industries. Furthermore, 
findings are robust to the inclusion of a large variety of control variables, including some unique 
measures of individuals’ preferences and variables such as socioeconomic status that are partly a realized 
outcome of occupational automation risk. Finally, the effect of automation risk on preferences for 
redistribution is also found when considering indirect exposure to automation risk through the occupation 
of one’s spouse or partner. Hence, results do not appear driven by unobserved individual differences in 
preferences or skill level. 
Recent years have seen an increasingly intense debate about the possible disruptive effects of 
technological advances in robotics and artificial intelligence algorithms, among others. A most prominent 
issue thereby involves the distributional effects of technological change and the concern that some groups 
in society will not only lose from automation in relative terms but possibly also in absolute terms. 
However, as this paper shows, automation can have important societal implications even when the 
objective threat of automation causing unemployment and income losses is limited. The reason is that fear 
and anxiety about automation alone are sufficient to radically alter people’s political attitudes and 
increase the pressure on governments to take action. 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
<<Insert Tables A.1-A.9 here>> 
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Appendix B 
This appendix describes the operationalization of the framework of universal human values using the 
Portrait Values Questionnaire or PVQ developed by Schwartz and collaborators (Schwartz et al. 2001). 
The PVQ consists of 21 “portraits” that ask individuals to describe themselves. The generic item text 
reads: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much 
each person is or is not like you.” Answers can range from “1, Very much like me” to “6, Not like me at 
all.” Table B.1 describes the 21 portraits and how they relate to the 10 basic values and motivations 
recognized in the universal human values framework. 
 
<<Insert Table B.1 about here>> 
 
As mentioned in the main text, in the universal human values framework, values only have a relative 
priority and not an absolute priority. Practically, getting from absolute scores on the PVQ items to relative 
priorities, requires that we ipsatize all individual ratings (Schwartz et al. 2001). To do so, we first need to 
calculate individuals’ average score on the 21 items and then subtract this average score from individuals’ 
scores on each item. This renders item scores that are standardized to indicate how weakly or strongly an 
individual scores on a particular value item compared to his/her score on other value items. Moreover, 
given that answers originally come on a 1 to 6 scale, ipsatized item scores can, in principle, vary from -5 
to +5. Finally, ipsatized scores on the 21 items can be used to construct individual ratings on the 10 basic 
human values, following the mapping presented in Table B.1. In this case, ipsatized item scores are 
simply added and divided by the number of items. Theoretically, the range of possible scores on the 
resulting values measures can again range from -5 to +5. Figure B.1 present a graphical description of the 
interrelationship between the 10 distinct basic values in the framework of universal human values. 
 
<<Insert Figure B.1 about here>> 
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Table I. Construct Validity of Occupational Automatability. 
Correlations for 27 occupations Automatability Routineness 
Automatability 1  
Routineness 0.542 1 
Complexity -0.623 -0.773 
Notes: Indicators of occupational task routineness and complexity are constructed to concern occupations 
at the two-digit level of the 1988 version of the ISCO. Data on job routineness and 1988 ISCO codes are 
available from Waves 2 and 5 of the European Social Survey or ESS (European Social Survey 2016). I 
measure routineness using the ESS item asking respondents to indicate how much the statement “there is 
a lot variety in my work” applies to their job. Respondents can respond using the following answer scale: 
“1, Not at all true,” “2, A little true,” “3, Quite true,” or “4, Very true.” The occupational routineness 
indicator is constructed by reverse coding individual answers on this item and aggregating them at the 
two-digit ISCO level. Data on job routineness and complexity and 1988 ISCO codes are available from 
Waves 3-6 of the European Working Conditions Survey or EWCS (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2018). I measure job complexity using the EWCS item 
asking respondents whether their generally job involves complex tasks (1) or not (0). The occupational 
complexity indicator is constructed by aggregating individual answers on this item at the two-digit ISCO 
level. Dropping occupations with fewer than 20 underlying individual responses for both the routineness 
and the complexity indicator leaves 27 two-digit occupations. 
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Table II. Occupational Automatability and Preferences for Redistribution. 
Dependent = preference for 
redistribution 1 2 3 4 5 
Automation risk 0.077   (0.018) [0.000] 
0.074   (0.018) 
[0.000] 
0.054   (0.014) 
[0.001] 
0.054   (0.014) 
[0.001] 
0.057   (0.016) 
[0.002] 
Sex (1=Male) -0.129   (0.022) [0.000] 
-0.131   (0.022) 
[0.000] 
-0.126   (0.018) 
[0.000] 
-0.130   (0.018) 
[0.000] 
-0.128   (0.021) 
[0.000] 
Years of education -0.011   (0.014) [0.408] 
-0.011   (0.014) 
[0.424] 
0.012   (0.013) 
[0.353] 
0.012   (0.013) 
[0.370 
0.015   (0.013) 
[0.248] 
Belief about importance of family 
wealth for getting ahead - 
0.066   (0.006) 
[0.000] - 
0.057   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
0.057   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
Rank of social class - - -0.097   (0.007) [0.000] 
-0.095   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
-0.092   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
Rank of top-bottom self-placement - - -0.094   (0.006) [0.000] 
-0.091   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
-0.091   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
Job routineness - - - - 0.002   (0.028) [0.938] 
Job complexity - - - - -0.009   (0.027) [0.745] 
Dummies for occupational prestige 
relative to father No Yes No Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for education level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for religious denomination Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for religious attendance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and age2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of occupations 33 33 33 33 27 
No. of individuals 44,935 44,935 44,935 44,935 44,493 
R2 0.1987 0.2033 0.2192 0.2225 0.2229 
Notes: Results obtained using the ISSP-SI sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level of 
occupations. P-values are in square brackets. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. To save space, the table presents a selection of coefficients, standard errors and p-values but complete results are 
available on request. 
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Table III. Spousal Automation Risk and Preferences for Redistribution. 
Dependent = preference for 
redistribution 6 7 8 
Spousal automation risk 0.034   (0.012) [0.006] 
0.028   (0.012) 
[0.024] 
0.026   (0.010) 
[0.017] 
Automation risk - 0.055   (0.008) [0.000] 
0.055   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
Spousal job routineness - - 0.022   (0.014) [0.130] 
Spousal job complexity - - 0.003   (0.014) [0.801] 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes 
No. of spousal occupations 33 33 27 
No. of individuals 29,303 25,685 25,376 
R2 0.2374 0.2490 0.2515 
Notes: Results obtained using the ISSP-SI sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard 
errors that are clustered at the level of spousal occupations. P-values are in square brackets. The 
dependent variable and continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. Other control variables are years of education, sex, belief about importance of 
family wealth for getting ahead, rank of social class, rank of top-bottom self-placement, dummies for 
employment status, dummies for religious denomination, dummies for religious attendance, dummies for 
occupational prestige relative to father, dummies for education level, age, age squared, dummies for 
country and dummies for year (see Model 4 in Table II). To save space, the table presents a selection of 
coefficients, standard errors and p-values but complete results are available on request. 
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Table A.1. Automatability of Selected Occupations. 
Occupation (two-digit ISCO88 code in square brackets) Automatability score 
Legislators and senior officials [11] 3.24 
Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals [21] 3.35 
Corporate managers [12] 3.53 
General managers [13] 3.66 
Customer services clerks [42] 3.83 
Metal, machinery and related trades workers [72] 3.84 
Office clerks [41] 3.84 
Machine operators and assemblers [82] 3.91 
Drivers and mobile-plant operators [83] 3.96 
Notes: Source is own calculations based on data from the 1997 ISSP Work Orientations module (ISSP 
Research Group 1999). 
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Table A.2. Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics for Selected ISSP-SI Variables. 
Variable and variable description Mean and SD 
Preference for redistribution (1-5). 
See the main text for a description. 3.71     (1.16) 
Occupational automation risk (two-digit ISCO88) (1-5) [n=45,061]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.76     (0.144) 
Spousal automation risk (1-5) (two-digit ISCO88) [n=29,303]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.77     (0.144) 
Occupational automation risk (three-digit ISCO88) (1-5) [n=43,710]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.77     (0.194) 
Occupational automation risk (four-digit ISCO88) (1-5) [n=33,778]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.78     (0.249) 
Sex (1=male; 0=female) 47.1%     (49.9%) 
Age(in years) 46.5     (16.3) 
Years of education. 
Measured by the item asking respondents how many (full-time equivalent) years they 
have been in formal education. 
11.6     (3.78) 
Education level. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about the 
highest level of education that they have attained. Answers are coded using the 
International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED): “No formal 
qualification,” “Lowest formal qualification,” “Above lowest qualification,” “Higher 
secondary completed,” “Above higher secondary level,” or “University degree 
completed, graduate studies.” 
 
Employment status. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about their 
current employment status / economic position / main source of living. Answer 
categories are “Employed, full-time,” “Employed, part-time,” “Employed, less than 
part-time,” “Helping family member,” “Unemployed,” “Student, at school, in 
education, vocational training,” “Retired,” “Housewife, houseman, home duties,” 
“Permanently disabled, sick,” “Other, not in labor force,” or “Employed” (with the 
latter category only used in the 1987 module). 
 
Social class percentile rank. 
Measured by the item asking respondents to which social class they belong. Possible 
answers are Lower class, Working class, Lower middle class, Middle class, Upper 
middle class, or Upper class. To fit the idea of median income or wealth (Meltzer and 
Richards 1981) answers are recoded into a percentile score that ranks respondents’ 
social class relative to the social class of respondents from the same country surveyed 
in the same year. 
50.3     (26.4) 
Top-bottom self-placement percentile rank. 
Measured by the item asking respondents for a subjective assessment of the group in 
society to which they belong, a group that tends towards the top or a group that tends 
towards the bottom. Answers range from “1, Lowest/Poorest/Bottom” to “10, 
Highest/Richest/Top.” To fit the idea of median income or wealth (Meltzer and 
Richards 1981) answers are recoded into a percentile score that ranks respondents’ 
top-bottom self-placement relative to the top-bottom self-placement of respondents 
from the same country surveyed in the same year. 
50.4     (27.9) 
Belief about importance of family wealth for getting ahead (1-5). 
Measured by the item asking respondents how important coming from a wealthy 
family is for getting ahead. Possible answers range from “1, Essential” to “5, Not 
2.87     (1.13) 
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important at all” and are reverse coded for the empirical analysis. 
Occupational status compared to father. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about the 
level of status of their job compared to their father’s job. Possible answers are “Much 
higher,” “Higher,” “About equal,” “Lower,” “Much lower,” “I never had a job,” or “I 
don’t know what my father did, father never had a job, never knew father.” 
 
Religious denomination. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking “Do you belong to a 
religion and, if yes, which religion do you belong to?” Answer categories are “No 
religion,” “Roman Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Christian Orthodox,” “Jewish,” “Islam,” 
“Buddhism,” “Hinduism,” “Other Christian Religions,” “Other Eastern Religions,” 
“Other Religions,” or “No (Christian) denomination given.” 
 
Religious attendance. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about their 
attendance of religious services. Possible answers are “Once or several times a 
week,” “Once to three times a month,” “Several times a year,” “Less frequently, once 
or twice a year,” “Never,” or “Not applicable, no (Christian) religion.” 
 
Job routineness (two-digit ISCO88) (1-4) [n=44,493]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 2.13     (0.321) 
Job complexity (two-digit ISCO88) (0-1) [n= 44,493]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 0.598     (0.165) 
Spousal job routineness (1-4) (two-digit ISCO88) (1-4) [n=25,376]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 2.13     (0.316) 
Spousal job complexity (0-1) (two-digit ISCO88) (0-1) [n=25,376]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 0.599     (0.163) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations is 61,386 unless otherwise indicated. 
Sources are own calculations and the four ISSP Social Inequality modules (ISSP Research Group 2014). 
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Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics for Selected ESS Variables. 
Variable and variable description Mean and SD 
Preference for redistribution (1-5). 
See the main text for a description. 3.83     (1.05) 
Occupational automation risk (1-5) (two-digit ISCO88) [n=149,645]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.75     (0.145) 
Spousal automation risk (1-5) (two-digit ISCO88) [n=63,201]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.74      (0.154) 
Power values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. -0.891     (0.867) 
Achievement values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. -0.429     (0.924) 
Hedonism values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. -0.231     (0.967) 
Stimulation values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. -0.703     (0.992) 
Self-direction values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. 0.404     (0.765) 
Universalism values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. 0.598     (0.632) 
Benevolence values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. 0.711     (0.641) 
Tradition values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. 0.008     (0.911) 
Conformity values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. -0.128     (0.943) 
Security values (-5,5). 
See Appendix B for a description. 0.362     (0.857) 
Left-right self-placement (0, Left - 10, Right). 
Measured by the item “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right.” Using 
this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 
10 means the right?” 
5.10     (2.18) 
Political trust. 
Measured as the factor of two items (Cronbach α = 0.842, well-above the standard 
threshold value of 0.7; e.g., Clark and Watson 1995). The first item asks about “trust 
in the country’s parliament” and the second item about “trust in politicians.” Both 
items use a Likert-type answer scale that ranges from “0, No trust at all” to “10, 
Complete trust.” 
0.134     (0.971) 
Sex (1=male; 0=female) 48.8%     (50.0%) 
Age (in years) 47.6     (17.6) 
Years of education. 
Measured by the item asking respondents how many years of fulltime education they 
have completed. 
12.8     (4.06) 
Education level. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about the 
highest level of education that they have achieved. Answer are coded using the ESS 
version of the ISCED: “Less than lower secondary education,” “Lower secondary 
education completed,” “Upper secondary education completed,” “Post-secondary 
non-tertiary education completed,” “Tertiary education completed,” “Other,” or “Not 
possible to harmonize.” 
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Employment status. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about what 
they have been doing for the last 7 days. Answers are coded into the following 
categories: “Paid work,” “Education,” “Unemployed, looking for job,” 
“Unemployed, not looking for job,” “Permanently sick or disabled,” “Retired,” 
“Community or military service,” “Housework, looking after children, others,” or 
“Other.” 
 
Income rank percentile. 
Measured using the item asking respondents about the total net income of their 
household. Waves 1-3 of the ESS used a 12-point scale, while the later waves used a 
10-point answer scale for this item. Hence, to ensure intertemporal as well as cross-
country comparability answers are recoded into a percentile score that ranks 
respondents’ score on the income scale relative to the income scores of respondents 
from the same country surveyed in the same year. 
52.3     (28.3) 
Poor health (1-5). 
Measured by the item asking “How is your health in general?” with five possible 
answers, ranging from “1, Very good” to “5, Very bad.” 
2.16     (0.890) 
Unemployed and seeking work for more than three months (1=yes; 0=no). 
Measured by the item asking respondents whether they have ever been unemployed 
and seeking work for a period of more than three months? 
26.8%     (44.3%) 
Education level father. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about the 
highest level of education achieved by their father. Answer are coded using the ESS 
version of the ISCED) “Less than lower secondary education,” “Lower secondary 
education completed,” “Upper secondary education completed,” “Post-secondary 
non-tertiary education completed,” “Tertiary education completed,” “Other,” or “Not 
possible to harmonize.” 
 
Education level mother. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about the 
highest level of education achieved by their mother. Answer are coded using the ESS 
version of the ISCED: “Less than lower secondary education,” “Lower secondary 
education completed,” “Upper secondary education completed,” “Post-secondary 
non-tertiary education completed,” “Tertiary education completed,” “Other,” or “Not 
possible to harmonize.” 
 
Employment status father when respondent was 14. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking “When you were 14, did 
your father work as an employee, was he self-employed, or was he not working 
then?” Possible answers are “Employee,” “Self-employed,” “Not working,” or 
“Father dead/absent.” 
 
Employment status mother when respondent was 14. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking “When you were 14, did 
your mother work as an employee, was she self-employed, or was she not working 
then?” Possible answers are “Employee,” “Self-employed,” “Not working,” or 
“Mother dead/absent.” 
 
Religious denomination. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents which 
religion or denomination they belong to at present. Individuals that indicated having 
no religion or domination are coded as the base category. Other answer categories are 
“Roman Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Eastern Orthodox,” “Other Christian 
denomination,” “Jewish,” “Islamic,” “Eastern religions,” or “Other non-Christian 
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religions.” Base category is individuals that indicated having no religious 
denomination. 
Religious attendance. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking “Apart from special 
occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious 
services nowadays?” Possible answers are “Every day,” “More than once a week,” 
“Once a week,” At least once a month,” “Only on special holy days,” “Less often,” 
or “Never.” 
 
Job routineness (two-digit ISCO88) (1-4) [n=148,968]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 2.10     (0.321) 
Job complexity (two-digit ISCO88) (0-1) [n=148,968]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 0.609     (0.167) 
Spousal job routineness (1-4) (two-digit ISCO88) (1-4) [n=60,535]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 2.06     (0.299) 
Spousal job complexity (0-1) (two-digit ISCO88) (0-1) [n=60,535]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 0.631     (0.164) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations is 162,399 unless otherwise indicated. 
Sources are own calculations and ESS, Waves 1-7 (European Social Survey 2016). 
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Table A.4. Descriptive Statistics for Selected ISSP-ROG Variables. 
Variable and variable description Mean and SD 
Preference for government support of declining industries (1-5). 
See the main text for a description. 2.57     (1.17) 
Occupational automation risk (1-5) (two-digit ISCO88). 
See the main text for a description. 3.75     (0.154) 
Spousal automation risk (1-5) (two-digit ISCO88) [n=16,544]. 
See the main text for a description. 3.76      (0.153) 
Preference for redistribution (1-5). 
Measured using the same item on preferences for redistribution as used by ISSP-SI 
(see the main text). 
2.98     (0.988) 
Preference for government financing of projects for new jobs (1-5). 
Measured by the item asking respondents about their view on government financing 
of projects to create new jobs. The item starts with the same generic text as the 
measure concerning government support of declining industries. Answers can range 
from “1, Strongly in favor of” to “5, Strongly against” and are reverse coded for the 
empirical analysis. 
3.13     (0.911) 
Preference for government spending on unemployment benefits (1-5). 
Measured by the item asking respondents whether they would like to see more or less 
government spending on employment benefits. Answers can range from “1, Spend 
much more” to “5, Spend much less” and are reverse coded for the empirical 
analysis. 
3.10     (1.02) 
Preference for government responsibility for living standard of the unemployed (1-4). 
Measured by the item asking respondents whether it should or should not be the 
government’s responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the 
unemployed. Possible answers can range from “1, Definitely should be” to “4, 
Definitely should not be” and are reverse coded for the empirical analysis. 
2.84     (0.873) 
Sex (1=male; 0=female) 51.0%     (50.0%) 
Age (in years) 46.1     (15.5) 
Years of education. 
Measured by the item asking respondents how many (full-time equivalent) years they 
have been in formal education. 
12.6     (3.50) 
Education level. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about the 
highest level of education that they have attained. Answers are coded using the 
International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED): “No formal 
qualification,” “Lowest formal qualification,” “Above lowest qualification,” “Higher 
secondary completed,” “Above higher secondary level,” or “University degree 
completed, graduate studies.” 
 
Employment status. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about their 
current employment status / economic position / main source of living. Answer 
categories are “Employed, full-time,” “Employed, part-time,” “Employed, less than 
part-time,” “Helping family member,” “Unemployed,” “Student, at school, in 
education, vocational training,” “Retired,” “Housewife, houseman, home duties,” 
“Permanently disabled, sick,” “Other, not in labor force,” or “Employed.” 
 
Religious denomination. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking “Do you belong to a 
religion and, if yes, which religion do you belong to?” Answer categories are “No 
religion,” “Roman Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Christian Orthodox,” “Jewish,” “Islam,” 
 
 39 
“Buddhism,” “Hinduism,” “Other Christian Religions,” “Other Eastern Religions,” 
“Other Religions,” or “No denomination given.” 
Religious attendance. 
Measured as a set of dummies derived from the item asking respondents about their 
attendance of religious services. Possible answers are “No religion,” “Several times a 
week,” “Once a week,” “Two or three times a month,” “Once a month,” “Several 
times a year,” “Once a year,” “Less frequently,” or “Never.” 
 
Job routineness (two-digit ISCO88) (1-4) [n=29,062]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 2.10     (0.313) 
Job complexity (two-digit ISCO88) (0-1) [n=29,062]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 0.614     (0.165) 
Spousal job routineness (1-4) (two-digit ISCO88) (1-4) [n=16,201]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 2.09     (0.306) 
Spousal job complexity (0-1) (two-digit ISCO88) (0-1) [n=16,201]. 
See Table I / the main text for a description. 0.615     (0.162) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations is 29,718 unless otherwise indicated. 
Sources are own calculations and the third and fourth Role of Government module of the ISSP (ISSP 
Research Group 2008). 
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Table A.5. Construct Validity of Measured Preference for Redistribution. 
Description of construct related to preference for 
redistribution Average redistribution preference (1-5) 
Government should provide jobs for everyone who wants 
one [n=34,826]    
Strongly agree 4.20 (SD=1.05) [n=12,486] 
Agree 3.62 (SD=0.942) [n=12,284] 
Neither agree nor disagree 3.26 (SD=1.03) [n=4,298] 
Disagree 2.70 (SD=1.10) [n=4,494] 
Strongly disagree 2.00 (SD=1.30) [n=1,264] 
Government should provide decent living standard for 
unemployed [n=42,180]    
Strongly agree 4.45 (SD=0.936) [n=9,660] 
Agree 3.73 (SD=0.978) [n=17,837] 
Neither agree nor disagree 3.47 (SD=1.10) [n=8,432] 
Disagree 3.03 (SD=1.26) [n=4,786] 
Strongly disagree 2.79 (SD=1.56) [n=1,465] 
Government should provide basic income for all 
[n=32,792]    
Strongly agree 4.25 (SD=1.03) [n=9,399] 
Agree 3.66 (SD=0.945) [n=11,657] 
Neither agree nor disagree 3.39 (SD=1.01) [n=4,202] 
Disagree 2.89 (SD=1.15) [n=5,495] 
Strongly disagree 2.46 (SD=1.41) [n=2,039] 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Number of observations in square brackets. Data are from the 
first, second and fourth ISSP Social Inequality modules (ISSP Research Group 2014). 
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Table A.6. Robustness of ISSP-SI Results to Construction of Occupational Automatability Indicator. 
Dependent = preference for 
redistribution 
Minimum 50 individual 
observations for 
measuring occupational 
automatability 
Minimum 10 individual 
observations for 
measuring occupational 
automatability 
Occupational 
automatability measured 
at three-digit ISCO level 
Occupational 
automatability measured 
at four-digit ISCO level 
A1 A2 A3 A4 
Automation risk 0.055   (0.014) [0.001] 
0.053   (0.014) 
[0.001] 
0.040   (0.011) 
[0.000] 
0.030   (0.010) 
[0.003] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of two-digit occupations 31 36 - - 
No. of three-digit occupations - - 111 - 
No. of four-digit occupations - - - 179 
No. of individuals 44,889 45,061 43,710 33,778 
R2 0.2227 0.2225 0.2228 0.2205 
Notes: Results obtained using the ISSP-SI sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level of two-
digit occupations, three-digit occupations or four-digit occupations. P-values are in square brackets. The dependent variable and continuous 
independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Control variables are years of education, sex, belief 
about importance of family wealth for getting ahead, rank of social class, rank of top-bottom self-placement, dummies for employment status, 
dummies for religious denomination, dummies for religious attendance, dummies for occupational prestige relative to father, dummies for 
education level, age, age squared, dummies for country and dummies for year (see Model 4 in Table II). To be sure, for the models with 
occupational automatability measured at the three- or four-digit ISCO level, I only include occupations with minimum 20 individual observations 
for measuring occupational automatability. To save space, the table presents a selection of coefficients, standard errors and p-values but complete 
results are available on request. 
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Table A.7. Occupational Automatability and Preferences for Redistribution, ESS Sample. 
Dependent = preference for 
redistribution A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Automation risk 0.078   (0.014) [0.000] 
0.061   (0.011) 
[0.000] 
0.068   (0.010) 
[0.000] 
0.051   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.050   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.046   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
Income rank - -0.105   (0.012) [0.000] 
- -0.083   (0.010) 
[0.000] 
-0.081   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
-0.082   (0.010) 
[0.000] 
Poor health - 0.031   (0.004) [0.000] 
- 0.015   (0.003) 
[0.000] 
0.014   (0.003) 
[0.000] 
0.014   (0.003) 
[0.000] 
Unemployment experience 
(1=yes) 
- 0.099   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
- 0.074   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
0.072   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
0.073   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
Political left/right self-placement - - -0.185   (0.018) [0.000] 
-0.176   (0.017) 
[0.000] 
-0.170   (0.017) 
[0.000] 
-0.176   (0.018) 
[0.000] 
Political trust - - -0.057   (0.005) [0.000] 
-0.046   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
-0.047   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
-0.046   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
Job routineness - - - - - -0.001   (0.016) [0.952] 
Job complexity - - - - - -0.016   (0.017) [0.342] 
Sex (1=Male) -0.146   (0.016) [0.000] 
-0.129   (0.013) 
[0.000] 
-0.079   (0.010) 
[0.000] 
-0.072   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
-0.072   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
-0.068   (0.011) 
[0.000] 
Years of education -0.021   (0.008) [0.014] 
-0.014   (0.008) 
[0.074] 
-0.034   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
-0.016   (0.005) 
[0.005] 
-0.015   (0.005) 
[0.007] 
-0.014   (0.005) 
[0.010] 
21-item PVQ values battery No No No No Yes No 
10 basic human values No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Dummies education level father Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies education level mother Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies employment status 
father individual age 14 Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies employment status 
mother individual age 14 Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of occupations 31 31 31 31 31 27 
No. of individuals 149,645 149,645 149,645 149,645 149,645 148,968 
R2 0.1330 0.1437 0.1832 0.1936 0.2012 0.1942 
Notes: Results obtained using the ESS sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level of 
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occupations. P-values are in square brackets. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. Other control variables are dummies for employment status, dummies for religious denomination, dummies for 
religious attendance, dummies for education level, age, age squared, dummies for country and dummies for year. Model A9 repeats model A8 but 
instead of including measures of the 10 basic human values it includes the complete set of items used to measure these 10 values (see Appendix 
B). The advantage of including the 21 items separately is that they provide a more fine-grained measure of individual differences in preferences. 
The disadvantage is that the theoretical meaning of these 21 items is not clear. Hence, the model that includes measures of the 10 basic human 
values is the preferred model. To save space, the table presents a selection of coefficients, standard errors and p-values but complete results are 
available on request. 
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Table A.8. Spousal Automation Risk and Preferences for Redistribution, ESS sample. 
Dependent = preference for 
redistribution A11 A12 A13 
Automation risk - 0.058   (0.005) [0.000] 
0.057   (0.005) 
[0.000] 
Spousal automation risk 0.035   (0.008) [0.000] 
0.031   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.020   (0.008) 
[0.019] 
Spousal job routineness - - 0.011   (0.015) [0.473] 
Spousal job complexity - - -0.009   (0.015) [0.5556] 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes 
No. of spousal occupations 31 31 27 
No. of individuals 63,201 61,006 60,535 
R2 0.2067 0.2082 0.2086 
Notes: Results obtained using the ESS sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the level of spousal occupations. P-values are in square brackets. The dependent 
variable and continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. Other control variables are years of education, sex, income rank, poor health, 
unemployment experience, political trust, political left/right self-placement, 10 basic human values, 
dummies for employment status, dummies education level father, dummies education level mother, 
dummies employment status father individual age 14, dummies employment status mother individual age 
14, dummies for religious denomination, dummies for religious attendance, dummies for education level, 
age, age squared, dummies for country and dummies for year (see Model A8 in Table A.7). To save 
space, the table presents a selection of coefficients, standard errors and p-values but complete results are 
available on request. 
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Table A.9. Exposure to Automation Risk and Preferences for Government Support of Declining Industries. 
Dependent = preference for 
government support of declining 
industries 
 
 
A14 
 
 
A15 
Occupational 
controls Spousal automation risk 
A16 A17 A18 
Automation risk 0.090   (0.013) [0.000] 
0.060   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
0.051   (0.013) 
[0.001] 
0.047   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.050   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
Spousal automation risk - - - 0.039   (0.009) [0.000] 
0.022   (0.012) 
[0.073] 
Preference for redistribution - 0.139   (0.007) [0.000] 
0.138   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
0.142   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
0.141   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
Preference for government financing 
of job creation - 
0.231   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
0.232   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
0.222   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.220   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
Preference for government spending 
on unemployment benefits - 
0.091   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.092   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.088   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
0.089   (0.008) 
[0.000] 
Preference for government 
responsibility for living standard of 
the unemployed 
- 0.083   (0.006) [0.000] 
0.083   (0.006) 
[0.000] 
0.082   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
0.082   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
Job routineness - - 0.027   (0.011) [0.025] - - 
Job complexity - - 0.005   (0.014) [0.728] - - 
Spousal job routineness - - - - 0.010   (0.013) [0.420] 
Spousal job complexity - - - - -0.020   (0.013) [0.135] 
Sex (1=male) -0.239   (0.020) [0.000] 
-0.186   (0.014) 
[0.000] 
-0.187   (0.014) 
[0.000] 
-0.223   (0.016) 
[0.000] 
-0.232   (0.016) 
[0.000] 
Years of education -0.075   (0.010) [0.000] 
-0.062   (0.009) 
[0.000] 
-0.059   (0.010) 
[0.000] 
-0.059   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
-0.055   (0.007) 
[0.000] 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of occupations 33 33 27 - - 
No. of spousal occupations - - - 33 27 
No. of individuals 29,718 29,718 29,062 16,544 16,201 
R2 0.1422 0.2597 0.2618 0.2609 0.2623 
Notes: Results obtained using the ISSP-ROG sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level of 
occupations or spousal occupations respectively. The dependent variable and continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 
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0 and a standard deviation of 1. Other control variables are dummies for employment status, dummies for religious denomination, dummies for 
religious attendance, dummies for education level, age, age squared, dummies for country and dummies for year. To save space, the table presents 
a selection of coefficients, standard errors and p-values but complete results are available on request. 
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Table B.1. Items for Measuring Basic Human Values. 
Basic value Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) items 
Self-direction 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him/her. He/she likes to do 
things in his/her own original way. 
2. It is important to him/her to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. 
He/she likes to be free and not depend on others. 
Stimulation 
3. He/she likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He/she thinks it is 
important to do lots of different things in life. 
4. He/she looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/she wants to have an exciting 
life. 
Hedonism 
5. Having a good time is important to him/her. He/she likes to “spoil” him/herself. 
6. He/she seeks every chance he/she can to have fun. It is important to him/her to do 
things that give him/her pleasure. 
Achievement 
7. It is very important to him/her to show his/her abilities. He/she wants people to 
admire what he/she does. 
8. Being very successful is important to him/her. He/she hopes people will recognize 
his/her achievements. 
Power 
9. It is important to him/her to be rich. He/she wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. 
10. It is important to him/her to be in charge and tell others what to do. He/she wants 
people to do what he/she says. 
Security 
11. It is important to him/her to live in secure surroundings. He/she avoids anything that 
might endanger his/her safety. 
12. It is important to him/her that the government insure his/her safety against all threats. 
He/she wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens. 
Conformity 
13. He/she believes that people should do what they are told. He/she thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching. 
14. It is important to him/her always to behave properly. He/she wants to avoid doing 
anything people would say is wrong. 
Tradition 
15. It is important to him/her to be humble and modest. He/she tries not to draw attention 
to him-/herself. 
16. Tradition is important to him/her. He/she tries to follow the customs handed down by 
his/her religion or his/her family. 
Benevolence 
17. It is very important to him/her to help the people around him/her. He/she wants to 
care for their well-being. 
18. It is important to him/her to be loyal to his/her friends. He/she wants to devote 
herself to people close to him/her. 
Universalism 
19. He/she thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. 
He/she believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
20. It is important to him/her to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even 
when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them. 
21. He/she strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
environment is important to him/her. 
Notes: See Schwartz et al. (2001) for details. 
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Figure B.1. Framework of Universal Human Values. 
  
Notes: The 10 basic values refer to distinct motivations guiding human action. The place of a value in the 
circumplex reflects the value’s compatibility with the other values where values that are adjacent are 
compatible whereas values that are opposite each other are not compatible. The main text provides a 
description of the 10 basic values. See Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz et al. (2001) for details. 
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